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ANGEL INVESTORS AROUND THE WORLD  
 
  
 
 
 ABSTRACT  
 
    
 We document that the choice between disintermediated individual angel investments and intermediated private 
equity and venture capital investments depends on legal, economic, and cultural differences. We find evidence of 
this using PitchBook's comprehensive data on more than 5,000 angel and 80,000 private equity and venture capital 
investments in 96 countries from 1977 to 2012. The data further indicate that investee firms funded by angels are 
less likely to successfully exit through either an IPO or an acquisition. These findings are robust to propensity 
score matching methods, as well as to clustering standard errors and excluding U.S. observations, among other 
approaches.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Private Equity, Angel Investor, Venture Capital, Entrepreneurship, Law and Finance, Culture 
  
3 
 
ANGEL INVESTORS AROUND THE WORLD 
 
“What bugs me is this whole start-up scene is a lifestyle, and there are these [angel] investors who think it’s sexy 
and want to be part of that lifestyle.” 
 
-- New York Times, December 2015, “Tips for the Aspiring Angel Investor”1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 International business, law, economics, and finance scholars have written about how institutional environments 
shape organizational structures and practices (Brouthers, 2002; Berry, Guillen, and Zhou, 2010; Choi and 
Contractor, 2016; Cumming, Filatotchev, Knill, Reeb, and Senbet, 2017; Miletkov, Poulsen, and Wintoki, 2017). 
Yet, there are few studies that consider at the level of the individual investor the relationship between the 
organization and its environment (Henisz and Swaminathan, 2008; Peng, Wang, and Jiang, 2008; Cantwell, 
Dunning, and Lundan, 2010; Regner and Edman, 2014; Van Hoorn and Maseland, 2016; El Ghoul, Guedhami, and 
Kim, 2017; Smit, Pennings, and Van Bekkum, 2017). We attempt to address this by examining the contexts that 
favor individual investors over private equity (PE) and venture capital (VC) investors. 
 The first “angel investors” were wealthy individuals who funded expensive Broadway productions. William 
Wetzel (1983) adopted the term in his pioneering study of the raising of seed capital in the U.S., using it to 
describe investors who fund entrepreneurs. The colorful quote with which we begin this paper illustrates the oft-
repeated view that there is a cultural dimension to angel investing. Still, there is little theory or evidence on angel 
investment in most parts of the world, and equally neglected is the impact of international differences in cultural 
and legal institutions on incidences of angel investments and on their outcomes--certainly in contrast to the 
considerable PE and VC literatures (Cumming, Fleming, and Schwienbacher, 2006; Batjargal, 2007; Guler and 
McGahan, 2007; Zacharakis, McMullen, and Shepherd, 2007; Madhaven and Iriyama, 2009; Cumming, Schmidt, 
and Walz, 2010; Cumming and Walz, 2010; Guler and Guillen, 2010; Iriyama, Li, and Madhaven, 2010; Gu and 
                                                 
1
 Daniel L. Gottfried gives no-nonsense angel-investing advice in a Paul Sullivan Money Matters column.  
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/03/your-money/tips-for-the-aspiring-angel-investor.html?_r=0  
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Lu, 2010; Cumming and Knill, 2012; Li and Zahra, 2012; Cumming, Syvrud, and Knill, 2016; Dai and Nahata, 
2016). 
We seek to add to the angel investing literature by examining how institutional theory can explain the relative 
importance of angel and PE and VC investment across countries. We shed light on how angel investment differs 
from PE and VC investment around the world, and how it is affected by the legal and cultural environment. Our 
analysis exploits the comprehensive data collected at the deal level of investee firms from PitchBook, which 
describes 85,940 completed deals in 96 countries from 1977 to 2012. Among those deals, 5,397 from 42 countries 
involve angels (either as single funders or as participants in co-invested or syndicated PE and VC funds). The 
dataset allows us to directly compare disintermediated angel and intermediated PE and VC investments at both 
deal and investee-firm level.  
The data indicate that, relative to PE and VC funds, angels invest in smaller, more active entrepreneurial firms 
that tend to be located in countries characterized by less effective legal environments and higher levels of 
individualism and risk-taking. This is the case for both first-round and later deals. The data also show that, relative 
to firms funded by PE and VC funds, those funded by angels have a lower probability of successful exits, through 
either an initial public offering (IPO) or an acquisition, although the difference is smaller in countries with a more 
effective legal environment, especially for IPO exits (Nahata, 2008; Nahata, Hazaruka, and Tandon, 2014). 
Moreover, we find no evidence in our subsample tests that angels provide a “stepping stone” to investee firms as 
some have suggested, but rather that a firm that receives angel investment in the first round has a lower probability 
of successfully exiting in later stages. A limitation of our data is that there is no natural experiment that enables a 
direct assessment of causality; nevertheless, we do as much as possible with the data to assess robustness. Our 
results are robust to various clustering methods to correct standard errors while controlling for fixed effects, and 
also to the use of propensity score matching. 
 The existing literature focuses more often on PE and VC than angel financing. The reason, we believe, for the 
comparative lack of work on angel investment lies in the fact that, in contrast to PE and VC deals, data on angel 
deals are limited. Nonetheless, prior research has established that angels are playing an increasingly important role 
in funding entrepreneurs at the seed and early stages, and indeed their importance in the entrepreneurial economy 
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has been recognized even more in recent years (Wetzel, 1987; Freear, Sohl, and Wetzel 1994; Mason and Harrison, 
1995; Morrissette, 2007). Additional research on angels is clearly warranted as many studies have found their 
importance to start-ups to be equal to that of VCs, with the angel total market being approximately the same size as 
the VC one (Sohl, 2003; Freear and Sohl, 2001; Mason and Harrison, 2002; Goldfarb, Hoberg, Kirsch, and 
Triantis, 2007; Sudek, Mitteness, and Baucus, 2008; Shane, 2009; OECD report, 2011). Our paper will contribute 
to a small but growing literature on angel investing. 
Angels usually are found among the friends and family members of entrepreneurs. Their financial support can 
consist of a one-time injection or can be ongoing over a start-up’s lifecycle. In addition to financial support, angels 
often provide managerial assistance and coaching (Freear, Sohl, and Wetzel, 1992; Shane, 2009; Maxwell, Jeffrey, 
and Lévesque, 2011). Angels prefer to invest in local firms, and in general do not use conventional control 
mechanisms, such as entering contracts, sitting on boards, or staging financing, and they hold smaller positions in 
investee firms than VCs (Wong, Bhatia, and Freeman, 2009; Wong, 2010; ARI Halo Report, 2015). 
Recent empirical studies of angels focus on their contributions to investee firms and on angel-VC differences. 
Using a regression discontinuity analysis, Kerr, Lerner, and Schoar (2014) found that angels can improve the 
survival, exits, employment, patenting, web traffic, and financing of investee firms. Although based on the 
investments of only two angel groups, their findings do confirm the positive side of angel group financing in that 
the firms that were funded achieved successful exits and reached high employment levels. In another recent study, 
Lerner, Schoar, Sokolinski, and Wilson (2015) extended the results of Kerr et al. (2014) to an international setting, 
looking at 13 angel groups from 12 countries, and confirming similar positive outcomes. However, neither of the 
studies investigated the relationships between angels and VCs. Hellmann, Schure, and Vo (2015) did consider how 
angels and VCs interact and found that angel and VC funding are dynamic substitutes, and firms that obtained 
more angel financing in the past are less likely to subsequently obtain VC funding. Their results also suggest that 
VC funding is associated with better exit outcomes. Dutta and Folta (2016) found that VC-funded firms have 
higher successful exit rates, but they also found that, based on patent data, the impact of angels on improving 
innovation rates is similar to that of VC firms. 
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There are also several theoretical studies that have built a useful foundation in comparing angels and VCs. 
Under the assumption that angels do not add value to investee firms while VCs do, Chemmanur and Chen (2014) 
developed a model that explains the reasons why entrepreneurs might want to obtain angel financing before 
approaching VCs. Schwienbacher (2009) assumed that both angels and VCs can add value and his model explains 
the choice entrepreneurs make between angels and VCs for early-stage financing. Hellmann and Thiele (2015) 
provide a “friends or foes” theory that explicitly models the interdependences between angels and VCs. The model 
assumes that investee firms want to proceed from angel financing to VC financing; however, angels may be 
squeezed out in later stages by VCs making use of their market power. Angels need to seek alternative exit routes 
when they face such a situation. One key insight is that the bargaining dynamics between angels and VCs may 
determine whether their relationship is complementary or substitutionary. 
Our paper builds on these important studies by providing large sample empirical evidence on the choice 
between angel and PE and VC investment around the world. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to 
use a multi-country private equity deal-level database to contrast the investments of angels and those of PE and VC 
investors. We not only document angel investing around the world but also show how legal and cultural 
differences are associated with disintermediated angel investments versus intermediated PE and VC investments.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss the prior literature and 
develop our hypotheses. We then present the data and our summary statistics, followed by regression analyses and 
robustness checks. In the final sections we discuss some limitations of the dataset as well as possible extensions, 
we then make concluding remarks and suggestions for future research.  
 
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND HYPOTHESES ON ANGEL INVESTMENT COMPARED TO 
PRIVATE EQUITY AND VENTURE CAPITAL FUND INVESTMENT 
Extant research shows that PE and VC investments can be catalysts for entrepreneurial growth and innovation, 
thus having a significant role in spawning economic growth around the world (Timmons and Bygrave, 1986; 
Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Gompers and Lerner, 1999; Cumming and Johan, 2013; Makhene, 2009). Yet by 
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and large, prior angel investment studies focus on just the U.S. market (Kerr et al., 2014; Dutta and Folta, 2016). 
There are notable exceptions of studies that consider differences between angel and PE and VC investment outside 
the U.S. Mason and Harrison (2002) look at U.K. angel investments using survey methods, while Li, Shi, Wu, Wu, 
and Zheng (2016) discuss Chinese government policies that promote angel investment, and Ding, Sun, and Au 
(2014) compare the selection criteria used by angels in China and Denmark. Still, like most others, these studies 
make single-country or two-country comparisons of angels, but do not consider institutional differences between 
angel and PE and VC investments in an international setting. The only international angel study that we are aware 
of is that of Lerner et al. (2015) which uses a small dataset from 13 angel groups in 12 countries, but not angel 
activity outside of grouped investments, and hence is not representative of the broader set of all angel activities 
(Bonini, Capizzi, Valletta, and Zocchi, 2018); the inconsistencies are even directly highlighted by inconsistencies 
between the detailed Italian data of Bonini et al. (2018) and the small sample of Lerner et al. (2015). In the VC and 
entrepreneurship literatures, international studies have highlighted that institutional differences matter for financial 
markets and economic development as well as for the contractual provisions and oversight intensity of PE and VC 
fund transactions (Cumming and Johan, 2013; Nahata et al., 2014; Lerner and Schoar, 2005; El Ghoul et al., 2017; 
Cumming et al., 2017). However, previous studies of angels have not considered such international differences. 
Our study fills this gap by investigating how differences in institutional environments affect the choice between 
angel and PE and VC investments. 
Angels have a long history as informal investors within the narrow subset of the PE market (Lamoreaux, 
Levenstein, and Sokoloff, 2004; Shane, 2009). There is a current trend for them to form groups and networks that 
pool money in order to make larger investments like the seed-stage funding of VC investors (Shane, 2012; Kerr et 
al., 2014; Lerner et al., 2015; Bonini et al., 2018). So far, these only account for about 2% of total angel investment 
(Wiltbank and Boeker, 2007) and their investment profiles are different from those of individual angels (Bonini et 
al., 2018). Again, our study makes an important contribution as it sheds more light on individual angels. 
Prior literature has outlined several major differences between angels and PE and VC investors. First, angels 
prefer investing in the seed or early stages of the start-up, while PE and VC funds usually participate in later-stage 
deals when firms have become more mature. Second, angels select projects based on personal relationships and use 
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relatively informal procedures (Sudek, 2006), while PE and VC funds use more sophisticated screening processes, 
due diligence and term sheet tools to build their portfolios (Cumming and Johan, 2013). Third, investment amounts 
are much smaller for angels (Ibrahim, 2008). Although Sohl (2003) estimated that around 300,000 to 350,000 
angels in the U.S. invest about $30 billion in about 50,000 firms yearly, the average investment amount was 
roughly one to two million. Fourth, angels use their own money (Van Osnabrugge, 2000), while PE and VC funds 
act as financial intermediaries in investing in private firms on behalf of their investors (Avdeitchikova, Landstrom, 
and Mansson, 2008).  
In agency theory terms, angels are principals in their own investments who bear all the downside risks of 
failure while PE and VC funds act as agents who can mitigate such risks (Edelman, Manolova, and Brush, 2017). 
Therefore, they face different incentives and constraints and their investment risk tolerance profile and expected 
returns should be different. Aernoudt (1999) estimated that angels expect returns of around 20% while PE and VC 
funds look for projects with expected returns of around 35% to 45%. In addition, PE and VC funds charge 
management fees of 1-2% and a carried interest of 10-30% (Johan and Najar, 2010), while angels do not have 
institutional investors and hence do not have similar compensation structures. Moreover, according to the survey 
done by Shane (2005), angels do not invest purely for financial gain, but for a variety of other reasons, from 
economic, like creating and growing companies, to social, such as supporting the community. They might invest to 
benefit a known partner or for personal reasons, for instance, finding a job, making use of an expertise, learning 
something new, even just for the fun of it. This makes the aims of angel investors quite different from those of PE 
and VC investors; angels invest in persons more than companies, and although they do want the companies in 
which they invest to succeed, it is not merely so they will profit from that.  
Given the differences outlined above and the fact that angels invest their own capital, and thus are free of 
outside financial intermediation while PE and VC funds act as intermediaries between large institutional investors 
and entrepreneurial firms, we expect that the differences between angel investments and PE and VC investments 
will be more pronounced when legal, economic, and cultural conditions diverge, even when controlling for 
investment type. The literature has shown that institutional factors such as opportunity perception, legal 
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framework, and culture influence the emergence of angel investments (Edelman et al., 2017); our study takes a step 
further in comparing the investments of angels and PE and VC funds from an institutional perspective. 
In addition, while it is well established that PE and VC investment help foster better economic conditions, 
stock market development, and legal protection for minority shareholders, as well as cultures that favor 
entrepreneurship development (Nahata et al., 2014), our study looks at how these factors influence angel investing 
and the opportunities for exit relative to PE and VC funding. In contrast to PE and VC funds, angel investors are 
not constrained by institutional investor veto rights, annual (or semi-annual or quarterly) report monitoring, or by 
limited partnership agreements. As a result, angel investors are more prone to behavioral biases than PE and VC 
funds (Van Osnabrugge, 2000; Forrester, 2014), although VC investors do also have some biases (Franke, Gruber, 
Harhoff, and Henkel, 2006, 2008). Similarly, individual investors in public equity markets are subject to behavioral 
biases that are more pronounced than those of institutional investors (Barber and Odean, 2000). As we have said, 
angels invest their own money directly and often not only for purely financial reasons. On the other hand, PE and 
VC fund managers do not risk their own money and are motivated primarily by financial reasons. Thus, the legal 
environment will surely differentiate angels from PE and VC funds. Compared to PE and VC funds, individuals 
are generally more financially constrained in economic downturns. Because angel investment decisions are made 
alone and so may be more subject to behavioral biases, they are more likely to be impacted by economic 
conditions. Furthermore, we know from a large literature documenting the importance of national culture that it 
will shape the behavior and decision-making processes of individuals and organizations (Salter and Niswander, 
1995; Schwartz, 1999, 2014; Tung and Verbeke, 2010; Hofstede, 2010; Ronen and Shenkar, 2013; Boubakri, 
Guedhami, Kwok, and Saffar, 2016; Beugelsdijk, Kostova, and Roth, 2017; Devinney and Hohberger, 2017; 
Kirkman, Lowe, and Gibson, 2017; Griffin, Guedhami, Kwok, Li, and Shao, 2017; Mingo, Morales, and Dau, 
2018). Making investment decisions by themselves, leads angels to be involved in the very early-stages of start-up 
development, and as a result to bear all the downside risks; their investments are consequently more likely to be 
influenced by the cultural environment than those of PE and VC funds. Hence: 
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Hypothesis 1: Angel investment is more sensitive than PE and VC investment to international differences in 
legal, economic, and cultural conditions.  
 
PE and VC funds can provide start-ups with benefits such as certification, guidance, and networks. Previous 
studies have shown that certification and endorsement improve investment performance and facilitate exits 
(Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels, 1999; Hsu, 2004; Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu, 2007; 
Dutta and Folta, 2016). Angels differ from PE and VC funds in terms of the kind of relationship formed with 
investee firms and the scale and scope of the investment process. Some VC investors do not perceive angels as a 
source of risk reduction or as return enhancers (Heukamp, Liechtenstein, and Wakeling, 2007), and entrepreneurs 
have relatively higher levels of conflict with angels, which leads to early exits (Collewaert, 2012). In this sense, 
angels may be less likely to bring a certification effect to investee firms, especially during divestment stages.  
Angel investors tend to take minority common equity stakes in entrepreneurial firms without using onerous 
control rights (Wong et al., 2009; Wong, 2010). By contrast, VC investors tend to use much stronger control rights 
in an attempt to mitigate agency conflicts and to improve the chances of exit (Cumming and Johan, 2013). As such, 
legal environments that afford stronger protection to minority investors will improve the exit outcomes of angel 
investors, all else being equal, because country-level minority investor protection can substitute for the lack of 
direct contractual protection in angel deals. Therefore, firms funded by angels should have fewer successful exits 
than those funded by PE and VC investors, but the difference should be less pronounced in countries with better 
minority investor protection. Therefore:  
 
Hypothesis 2a: Firms funded by angel investors will have a lower probability of achieving successful exits by 
IPO or acquisition than firms funded by PE and VC investors, but the difference will be less pronounced in 
countries with stronger minority investor protection. 
 
Although angels might not be as good as PE and VC investors at facilitating IPO or acquisition exits, their 
investment at an early stage may still send a positive signal to future investors and that enables further credit 
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through the investment process (Elitzur and Gavious, 2003). Moreover, studies have shown that PE and VC funds 
rarely invest in companies which previously received angel funding; only a very small fraction of those companies 
attract PE and VC funding later on (Shane, 2009). However, Elitzur and Gavious (2003) found that angels can 
provide certification to improve the outcome of entrepreneur-VC transactions, and Schwienbacher (2007) predicts 
that theoretically the most promising ventures seek angel capital first in order to achieve an intermediate milestone 
before contacting VC investors to minimize dilution. So if angel-funded firms finally succeed in exiting through 
IPOs or acquisitions, angels can be said to provide certification (Kerr et al., 2014). This is similar to the commonly 
held view that angel financing is a stepping stone
2
 to obtaining venture capital, and angels and VC investors are 
synergistic members of a common financing ecosystem (Hellmann et al., 2015). Google, Facebook, and Tesla 
Motors are examples of the stepping-stone logic. We therefore expect that firms which have received angel 
investments in the first round may have a better chance of exiting successfully by an IPO or an acquisition. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Firms funded by angel investors in the first round will have a relatively higher probability of 
achieving a successful exit by IPO or acquisition. 
 
DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Our analysis exploits the comprehensive PitchBook database which provides information at the deal level on 
85,940 deals completed between 1977 and 2012 in 42,617 investee firms from 96 countries. Angels funded, either 
by themselves or with private equity and venture capital investors, 5,397 of those deals in 4,266 investee firms 
from 42 countries. This dataset allows us to compare angel and PE and VC funding. 
Figures 1 and 2 track angel and PE and VC investments between 1977 and 2012. Over this 36-year period, 
there was an increase in both angel and PE and VC investment, with small setbacks during the dot-com bubble and 
the recent financial crisis. Compared with PE and VC funds, angel funding, as measured by the total number of 
deals per year, seems to have better weathered the recent financial crisis. Our graphs show that angels and PE and 
                                                 
2
 As venture capitalist Marc Andreessen said during a lecture entitled, “How to Raise Money”, "So by far the best 
way to get the introductions to the A stage venture firms is to work through the seed investors." 
(https://genius.com/Marc-andreessen-lecture-9-how-to-raise-money-annotated) 
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VC funds have different profiles. Figure 1 indicates that total deal sizes for angels peaked in 2007 after which they 
shrank and continued shrinking until 2012, while for PE and VC funds deal size was much more synchronized with 
the total number of deals completed (Figure 2). 
 
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 About Here] 
 
 Table 1 shows the sample distribution of completed deals across the world. Table 1, Panel A, presents the Top 
10 countries for completed deals made by all investors, angel investors, and PE and VC investors. The U.S., 
Canada, and the U.K. are always the top three recipients in each of those categories. Most of the Top 10 recipients 
are OECD countries, with the exception of India and China. Most deals involve software and other high-growth 
and high-tech industries. Compared to PE and VC investors, angels are more active in the retail industry. 
 
[Insert Table 1 About Here] 
 
In Table 2, Panel A, we focus on investee firm-level characteristics. For each of the 42 countries in which there 
are completed angel deals, we calculate the total number of investee firms, the percentage of firms with angel 
financing (in all rounds), the percentage of firms with first round angel financing, and the percentage of firms with 
successful exits. On average, angels financed about 11% of firms in those 42 countries, about 8% in first round 
financing; about 24% of those investee firms had successful exits through IPOs or acquisitions. Table 2, Panel B, 
presents the same information at the deal level. While there are on average more than 2,000 deals completed each 
year for each country, only about 7% involve angels. This is not surprising, as angel data are rarely available and 
PitchBook only captures some of the big and prominent players in this market. Furthermore, only 5% of those 
deals receive angel first round financing, and about 15% result in successful exits.  
 
[Insert Table 2 About Here] 
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Table 3 provides information on the main variables in our dataset. Our main dependent variables are dummies 
for All Angel deals, Pure Angel deals, and Mixed Angel deals. Explanatory variables include GDP per capita to 
measure economic conditions, domestic stock market capitalization and the Morgan Stanley Capital International 
(MSCI) stock market returns to measure each country’s stock market conditions, an index of minority shareholders 
protection to measure the quality of the legal environment, Ronen and Shenkar (2013) cultural zones and 
Hofstede’s dimensions to measure cultural conditions, as well as a variety of other control variables to capture 
investee firm and industry characteristics. Our sample shows that there are many differences between angel and PE 
and VC investments. 
 
[Insert Table 3 About Here] 
 
In Table 4, we present a pair-wise correlation matrix for each of our variables. Some of our explanatory 
variables are highly correlated, which raises some possible collinearity issues which we explore in our multivariate 
empirical tests in the next section.  
 
[Insert Table 4 About Here] 
 
In the first subpanel of Table 5 we contrast angel and PE and VC deals and test for differences in means. 
Angels always make smaller-size deals than those of PE and VC investors and their investments are in more active 
investee firms. Angels also invest in firms with fewer employees. The geographical pattern of angel investments 
differs from that of PE and VC deals. Means difference tests show that angels invest more in countries that are 
wealthier and have a larger stock market, that have a more effective legal system, and that have a culture favoring 
individualism and entrepreneurial risk-taking. Compared to PE and VC investors, angels are less successful in 
either taking the investee firms public or having them be acquired. 
To address a possible sample selection bias that might cause problems for our comparison study, we use 
propensity score (PS) matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Lee and Wahal, 2004). This allows us to generate 
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two subsamples to perform counterfactual analyses in order to further validate our main hypotheses. We want to 
find the impact of angel funding compared to that of PE and VC funding, i.e. whether investee firms would have 
been better off with the former or the latter. 
It is possible that PE and VC investors choose to invest in firms that fit their exit strategies. But, what if angels 
could invest in firms and deals which are similar to those of PE and VC investors? What would the exit outcomes 
be? Is there any certification effect from angels? Such potential endogeneity problems may be particularly 
important for successful exits.  
To create the first subsample, we matched firms based on industry and deal size. We then generated a second 
subsample by matching angel and PE and VC deals based on all the characteristics listed in the first subpanel of 
Table 5. In the other two subpanels in Table 5 we present the results for differences in means for those two 
matched samples. While the original unmatched sample shows great differences between the deals made by angel 
and PE and VC investors, those differences almost vanish when using matched samples. This is especially the case 
for the institutional variables. These matched subsamples can help us limit the selection bias to some extent. We 
can therefore confidently undertake counterfactual analyses to see whether angels have certification effects on exit 
outcomes. 
 
[Insert Table 5 About Here] 
 
REGRESSION ANALYSES AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
In this section we perform our regression analyses using mainly probit models, controlling for year, industry, 
and country fixed effects. We report the marginal effects of each explanatory variable. We note at the outset that 
our sample and regression analyses do not involve direct natural experiments with clearly exogenous changes 
(such as death or war or natural disasters) and hence we are unable to show causality; nevertheless, we assess 
robustness through several subsample tests before drawing inferences from the data. 
 
What factors explain differences between angel and PE/VC investments? 
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In Table 6 we show the results of our probit models that explain the factors affecting the choice between 
different types of angel financing and PE and VC financing. In Models (1) to (4), the choice is between all types of 
angel financing and PE and VC financing; in model (5) between pure angel financing and PE and VC financing; in 
model (6) between mixed angel financing and PE and VC financing. We test for economic and stock market 
conditions, legal environments, investee firm characteristics, as well as Ronen and Shenkar (2013) cultural zones, 
together with Hofstede’s cultural dimensions. The main probit regression models in Table 6 use the following 
specification: 
 
 Investor Type = f (Economic and stock market conditions, legal environments, investee firm characteristics, 
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, cultural zone dummies, industry and country dummies) 
 
Most of the major variables are defined in Table 3. We are aware that there are many explanatory variables that 
we could have included but have not. The primary reasons for our parsimonious specification are (1) the selected 
variables are plausible determinants of investment choices, and (2) the excluded variables are highly collinear, 
hence their inclusion would potentially introduce spurious results into the regressions; this is the case for possible 
additional dimensions of Hofstede’s cultural variables, as well as other legal and institutional variables. In 
unreported tests we included all six dimensions of Hofstede’s cultural variables and the main results did not 
change, with individualism and uncertainty avoidance remaining the most significant factors. Likewise, replacing 
the minority shareholder protection index with other legal variables, such as a country’s legal origin, did not 
change the results.  
To investigate which features of the institutional environment affect the choice between angel and PE and VC 
investments, we add variables one at a time in Models (1) to (4). In Model (1) of Table 6, Panel A, we use the 
natural logarithm of GDP per capita to proxy for economic condition and the natural logarithm of domestic stock 
market capitalization, as well as the MSCI returns, to proxy for local stock market conditions. We find that, 
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without considering other institutional factors and firm-level characteristics, angels invest more in countries with 
higher GDP per capita and in those with smaller but higher-return stock markets. 
In Model (2) we add a minority shareholder protection index to capture legal environments. The minority 
shareholder protection index is the weighted average of ten key legal provisions identified by legal scholars as 
being most relevant to the protection of minority shareholder rights (Guillén and Capron, 2015).
3
 Higher values 
indicate more effective legal systems providing better minority shareholder protection.
4
 The results of Model (2) 
show that the marginal effect of the minority shareholders protection index is negative. Relative to PE and VC 
investors, angels invest more in countries with a less effective legal environment. Hellmann and Thiele (2015) 
suggest that angels prefer making deals with firms located in such countries as contracting costs are usually lower. 
For example, Scheela and Jittrapanun (2012) show that although angels find it challenging to invest in Thailand, 
where legal support for investors is weak, they do so because investing there is lucrative. Another reason why 
angels invest in such countries is that PE and VC funds are less likely to risk doing so and hence local firms have 
to turn to angels. 
In model (3) of Table 6 we test for the impact of investee firm-level characteristics with two variables, size and 
degree of funding activity. We measure size by the natural logarithm of the number of employees, and the funding 
activity of investee firms by the yearly number of deals they receive. The introduction of these two variables 
reduces the statistical significance of our three economic variables while the minority protection index remains 
significant as before. Compared to PE and VC investors, angels invest more in smaller sized but more active 
borrowers.  
Multiple international studies have shown that culture explains institutional differences (Tung and Verbeke, 
2010; Hofstede, 2010; Schwartz, 1999, 2014; Ronen and Shenkar, 2013; Beugelsdijk et al., 2017). Many empirical 
                                                 
3
 The detailed definitions of those ten legal provisions are in Guillén and Capron (2015) Table 1: (1) power of the 
general meeting for de facto changes, (2) agenda-setting power, (3) the anticipation of a facilitated shareholder 
decision, (4) prohibition of multiple voting rights, (5) independent board members, (6) feasibility of director 
dismissal, (7) private enforcement of director duties (derivative suit), (8) shareholder action against general meeting 
resolutions, (9) mandatory bid, and (10) disclosure of major share ownership (see also Lele and Siems, 2007; Siems, 
2008). 
4
 The authors are grateful to Mauro Guillén and Laurence Capron for sharing their minority shareholders protection 
index. This legal index is dynamic over the years to capture a more comprehensive legal environment with more 
countries and years covered. Given that angels mainly hold non-controlling shares, this index is suitable for 
capturing the expected legal protection environment for angels. 
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ones have confirmed that cultural differences are more region-specific than country-specific, which suggests 
entering variables at the supra-national level (Beugelsdijk et al., 2017). We therefore enter in model (4) of Table 6 
the country clusters identified by Ronen and Shenkar (2013). In addition, following the literature confirming that 
culture also affects entrepreneurship at the national level (Shane, 1993; Hayton, George and Zahra, 2002; 
Cumming, Johan, and Zhang, 2014), we choose two of the six Hofstede cultural dimensions, individualism (IDV) 
and uncertainty avoidance (UAI). The results of Model (4) show that the cultural environment is a significant 
factor affecting angel investments. With the Anglo cultural zone as the omitted category, we find that angels invest 
more than PE and VC investors in Germanic, Latin American, and Latin European cultural zones but less in the 
Nordic cultural zone. We also find that angels invest more than PE and VC investors in countries having cultures 
favoring entrepreneurial risk-taking. 
Up to now, we have investigated the factors that differentiate between all angel and PE and VC investors. We 
now differentiate between pure angels and mixed angels. In Model (5) of Panel A, we compare PE and VC 
investors with pure angels using the explanatory variables of Model (4) The results show that when angels work 
alone, they invest more in smaller sized but more active entrepreneurial firms located in less wealthy countries 
with less effective legal environments but better stock market returns. In model (6) of Panel A, we re-run model (5) 
with mixed angels. The results are similar to those of Model (4) which dealt with all angels. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is 
partially supported. 
In panel B of Table 6 we perform our first robustness check by considering only first-round deals. As most 
angels are involved in early and seed stages of start-up development, our results should be more compelling if H1 
held at these initial stages. Models (7) to (12) replicate the specifications of Models (1) to (6) in Panel A, and the 
results fully support H1: Differences in legal, economic, and cultural conditions are even better predictors of the 
choice between angel and PE and VC investors and the coefficients are even more statistically significant.  
In addition to this one, we perform two additional robustness tests. We use two PS-matched samples, a 
subsample excluding U.S. deals and one involving deals by angels and VCs. The results are presented in Panels C 
and D of Table 6. We replicate models (4) and (10) with these subsamples and find support for H1. When 
controlling for Ronen and Shenkar (2013) cultural zones, the host country’s individualism and uncertainty 
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avoidance indexes explain the choice between angel and PE and VC investments. H1 is also supported in the two 
PS-matched subsamples, with at least one variable in each category being significant. Excluding U.S. observations 
from our sample does not substantially affect the results, with only the sign of LN of GDP per capita changing due 
to the large share of U.S. observations in our sample. When we exclude PE investments, we find that legal, 
economic, and cultural conditions are even stronger determinants of the differences between angel and VC 
investments. 
 
[Insert Table 6 About Here] 
 
 
Is there a certification effect from angel investors on successful exits? 
 
Now that we have shown what explains differences between angels and PE and VC investments, we 
investigate whether angels receive higher or lower returns than other investors. Since it is hard to obtain credible 
performance measures like internal rates of return or performance multiples, we follow previous literature (Shane, 
2005; Wiltbank, 2005; DeGennaro & Dwyer, 2014) and use successful exit rates as an alternative measure of 
performance. Successful exits involve either an IPO or an acquisition. As in Table 6, we use probit models in Table 
7 with year, industry and cultural zone fixed effects. Our main regression models use the following specification:
5
 
 
Successful Exits Type = f (Investor type dummy, economic and stock market conditions, legal environments, 
investee firm characteristics, Hofstede’s cultural dimensions, industry and cultural zone dummies) 
  
                                                 
5
 For conciseness, we exclude showing all control variables which contain exactly the same variables in Table 6: LN 
of GDP per capita, LN of Domestic Market Capitalization, MSCI Returns, Minority Protection Index, LN of 
Number of Employees, Number of Deals per Year, IDV, and UAI. These variables are all excluded in Tables 7 and 
8. 
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We report the results for all successful exits, and those for IPOs and acquisitions separately. We also perform 
interaction tests with the minority shareholders protection index to determine whether a better legal environment 
can help increase successful exit performance. In addition, we perform robustness checks with a non-U.S. 
subsample and one of only angel and VC deals.  
In Table 7, Panel A, the dependent variables in Models (1) to (8) are dummy variables indicating whether the 
deal was a successful exit, either through IPO or acquisition. In Models (1) to (3), all three angel investor type 
dummies take a significantly negative sign (at the 1% level) confirming H2a, which posits that firms funded by 
angels have a lower probability of exiting successfully by either IPO or acquisition than those funded by PE and 
VC investors. Angel-funded firms are 26.65% less likely to exit successfully than those funded by PEs and VCs; 
they are also 8.19% less likely to exit by IPO and 20.71% less likely to exit by acquisition. Our results thus suggest 
that angels do not have a certification effect. Note that if we interact the minority shareholders protection index 
with the angel-related investor type dummies in Models (4) to (6), we find that the legal environment is very 
important for the quality of the capital market. As predicted in H2a, more effective legal protection can help 
increase successful exit rates for angels, especially through IPOs. Model (5) shows that more effective legal 
protection of minority shareholders increases the likelihood that angels will exit through IPOs but Model (6) shows 
that this is not true for exits through acquisitions. In addition, we find that when we test H2a on our non-U.S. 
sample, our results are consistent with those found for the whole sample, with angel-funded firms outside the U.S. 
still 13.35% less likely to exit successfully than those funded by PE and VC investors. If we exclude PE deals, the 
coefficients of all our variables lose significance.  
Panels B and C show the results of additional robustness checks based on our two matched samples. What 
happens when angels are investing in firms with the same characteristics as those funded by PE and VC funds? We 
have previously found that certification effects only apply to PE and VC investors; we do not find evidence of a 
certification effect of angels on exit outcomes. The results of Models (9) to (11) in Panel B of Table 7 are similar 
to those of Panel A, with the signs for angel funding negative and statistically significant at a 1% level. Hence 
angels do not provide certification as PE and VC investors do, even if they are investing in firms with almost the 
same characteristics. The interaction tests also confirm previous results that show that better legal protection can 
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help increase successful exit rates for angels, especially for IPO exits. However, we cannot find significant support 
for this proposition when using a non-U.S. subsample. Using our second matched sample, where deals are matched 
based on all the characteristics listed in the first subpanel of Table 5, yields results similar to those obtained using 
our first matched sample (see Panel C of Table 7). It seems that PE and VC funds can bring more expertise to the 
investee firms and have a higher likelihood of exiting their investments by IPO or acquisition. There might be 
other unobserved characteristics that can explain such results, but by using propensity score matching we provide 
another robustness check for our main results. 
 
[Insert Table 7 About Here] 
 
Although our tests in Table 7 help support H2a, we speculated whether angels could provide favorable signals 
to future investors or buyers. We created a dummy variable to capture those firms that have received their first-
round funding from angels and re-ran tests similar to those of Table 7 to explore this possibility. In Table 8, we 
included the new dummy variable as the main explanatory variable with different exit dummies as dependent 
variables. The results from Table 8 do not support H2b and show that firms receiving angel investments in their 
first round have a relatively lower probability of exiting successfully, especially through acquisitions. While the 
coefficient for angel financing in model (2) is statistically insignificant, those for models (1) and (3) are 
significantly negative, showing that angels do not act as stepping stones, at least not in our dataset.  
 
[Insert Table 8 About Here] 
 
DISCUSSION OF LIMITATIONS AND POSSIBLE FUTURE DATASETS 
In this study, we find that legal, economic, and cultural conditions are important determinants of the choice 
between angel and PE and VC funding. But our study is not without limitations. Perhaps the most notable one is 
that we cannot fully rule out endogeneity, as many angel deals are not included in the PitchBook dataset. We have 
considered many robustness checks, including but not limited to excluding various countries from our analyses, 
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and found the results to be consistent with those reported in the main text here and in the Online Appendix. But the 
PitchBook dataset and our empirical tests do not enable a perfect assessment of causality as we do not have a 
natural experiment that affords a clearly exogenous test. Furthermore, there is substantial heterogeneity across 
angels and we do not have data on the financial performance of investee firms. Having this information would 
facilitate further study on this topic. 
We did a number of robustness checks to assess as fully as possible the relationships between the variables. 
Further checks and tests are presented in the accompanying Online Appendix. We first present additional 
descriptive statistics on various subsamples and then the results of additional robustness checks. We hope our work 
will inspire scholars to continue to conduct research in this area and to look for future data sources with more 
comprehensive coverage.  
 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
We provide new evidence that legal, economic, and cultural conditions determine whether a firm will be 
funded by individuals or by organizations. We examine and compare angel investment and private equity and 
venture capital fund investment to test theoretical arguments suggesting that legal, economic, and cultural 
institutions have a more pronounced impact on individuals than on organizations. 
Our analysis exploits comprehensive data collected at the deal level of investee firms from PitchBook. This 
database of 85,940 completed deals in 96 countries spans a 36-year period from 1977 to 2012. Among those deals, 
5,397 in 42 countries involved angels (either investing on their own or with PE and/or VC funds). This dataset 
allowed us to compare angel and PE and VC investments at the deal level and the investee-firm level at the same 
time. We found that, relative to PE and VC funds, angels invest in smaller sized, more active entrepreneurial firms 
located in countries with less effective legal environments and with more individualistic and risk-taking cultures. 
This holds true both for first-round deals and deals at all other stages. We also found that, relative to PE and VC 
funds, firms funded by angels have a lower probability of having successful exits through either IPOs or 
acquisitions; but that more effective legal environments can help mitigate negative effects on IPO exits. Moreover, 
in our subsample tests, we do not find evidence that angels act as a stepping stone, because firms that received 
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angel investments in the first round have a lower probability of successful divesting in later rounds. Our results are 
robust under various clustering methods to correct standard errors while controlling for fixed effects and are also 
robust when performing propensity score matching. 
Angels are still an under-researched topic. We believe that with more credible data future researchers will be 
able to shed even more light on what opportunities angels prefer, how they make investments--both domestically 
and internationally, where their preferred locations are, how they syndicate or co-invest with other investors, which 
financial contracts they are likely to use, what the real relationship between entrepreneurs and angels is, and how 
their heterogeneity impacts their investments.  
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Table 1. Top 10 Country and Industry Distribution for Completed Deals 
This table summarizes the key features associated with the sample distribution of completed deals in the world. In this table, we show the top 10 
countries and industry distribution for those completed deals in three separate groups: All Deals, Angels Deals, and PE and VC Deals. 
Panel A: Top 10 Countries in terms of Number of Deals 
All Deals Angels Deals PE and VC Deals 
Country   Country   Country   
United States 73910 United States 4839 United States 69071 
Canada 2770 Canada 143 Canada 2627 
United Kingdom 2281 United Kingdom 123 United Kingdom 2158 
India 735 Israel 52 India 694 
Germany 661 India 41 Germany 623 
France 592 Germany 38 France 569 
China 516 France 23 China 500 
Israel 512 Ireland 17 Israel 460 
Netherlands 306 China 16 Netherlands 299 
Ireland 255 Spain 11 Australia 239 
Panel B: Top 10 Industries in terms of Number of Deals 
All Deals Angels Deals PE and VC Deals 
Industry   Industry   Industry   
Software 17235 Software 2129 Software 15106 
Commercial Services 10096 Media 612 Commercial Services 9570 
Commercial Products 6751 Commercial Services 526 Commercial Products 6624 
Media 4809 Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology 262 Healthcare Devices and Supplies 4554 
Healthcare Devices and Supplies 4794 Healthcare Devices and Supplies 240 Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology 4279 
Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology 4541 Retail 196 Media 4197 
Communications and Networking 3675 Communications and Networking 156 Communications and Networking 3519 
Healthcare Services 2833 Commercial Products 127 Healthcare Services 2758 
Consumer Non-Durables 2509 IT Services 114 Consumer Non-Durables 2417 
Computer Hardware 2379 Computer Hardware 94 Computer Hardware 2285 
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Table 2. Country Distribution Characteristics at the Portfolio Firm-Level and Deal-Level -- Angel Activities in All Rounds, First Round, and Exits in Percentages 
This table summarizes the detailed features associated with the country distribution of portfolio firms and completed deals in the world. In Panel A, we show the total number of investee firms in each 
country and the associated angel activity percentages, both in all rounds and in the first round, as well as the percentage of portfolio firms with successful exits. In Panel B, we show the total number of 
completed deals in each country and the associated angel activity percentages both in all rounds and in the first round, as well as the percentage of portfolio firms with successful exits. 
  Panel A: Investee Firm-Level Country Distribution Characteristics Panel B: Deal-Level Country Distribution Characteristics 
Country 
Total Number 
of Firms 
% of Firms with Angel 
Financing, all rounds 
% of Firms with Angel 
Financing, first round 
% of Firms with 
Successful Exits 
Total Number 
of Deals 
% of Deals with Angel 
Financing, all rounds 
% of Deals with Angel 
Financing, first round 
% of Deals as 
successful exits 
Argentina 24 25.00 20.83 20.83 44 13.64 11.36 11.36 
Australia 177 3.39 3.39 23.73 247 3.24 2.43 17.81 
Austria 37 2.70   18.92 64 1.56   14.06 
Belgium 73 6.85 4.11 24.66 138 4.35 2.17 16.67 
Bermuda 53 13.21 11.32 41.51 126 6.35 4.76 18.25 
Brazil 120 5.00 4.17 19.17 185 4.32 2.70 15.68 
Bulgaria 17 5.88   29.41 34 2.94   14.71 
Canada 1542 7.85 6.16 23.15 2770 5.16 3.43 13.94 
Chile 23 4.35   13.04 34 2.94   8.82 
China 273 5.13 4.40 21.98 516 3.10 2.33 12.21 
Colombia 19 5.26 5.26 36.84 28 3.57 3.57 32.14 
Croatia 1 100.00     2 50.00     
Czech Republic 28 3.57   25.00 50 2.00   16.00 
Denmark 61 1.64 1.64 13.11 103 1.94 0.97 7.77 
Finland 67 8.96 8.96 17.91 105 5.71 5.71 11.43 
France 298 5.70 4.36 23.15 592 3.89 2.20 11.99 
Germany 369 9.49 8.13 25.75 661 5.75 4.54 15.89 
Hong Kong 61 3.28 3.28 18.03 87 2.30 2.30 12.64 
India 364 9.34 7.14 14.29 735 5.58 3.54 7.89 
Ireland 120 10.83 6.67 20.00 255 6.67 3.14 10.20 
Israel 240 16.67 12.08 18.33 512 10.16 5.66 8.79 
Italy 104 4.81 4.81 26.92 200 2.50 2.50 17.50 
Japan 98 2.04 2.04 20.41 151 1.32 1.32 14.57 
Jordan 2 50.00 50.00 50.00 4 25.00 25.00 25.00 
Luxembourg 12 16.67 16.67 25.00 29 6.90 6.90 13.79 
Mexico 45 4.44   26.67 74 2.70   18.92 
Netherlands 161 3.73 2.48 25.47 306 2.29 1.31 14.38 
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Country 
Total Number 
of Firms 
% of Firms with Angel 
Financing, all rounds 
% of Firms with Angel 
Financing, first round 
% of Firms with 
Successful Exits 
Total Number 
of Deals 
% of Deals with Angel 
Financing, all rounds 
% of Deals with Angel 
Financing, first round 
% of Deals as 
successful exits 
Norway 70 1.43   21.43 108 0.93   16.67 
Panama 3 33.33 33.33 33.33 4 25.00 25.00 25.00 
Poland 30 3.33 3.33 16.67 41 2.44 2.44 12.20 
Portugal 20 5.00 5.00   21 4.76 4.76   
Romania 11 9.09 9.09 27.27 13 7.69 7.69 23.08 
Russia 36 5.56 2.78 25.00 68 4.41 1.47 13.24 
Singapore 50 4.00 4.00 22.00 92 2.17 2.17 14.13 
Slovenia 5 20.00 20.00   6 16.67 16.67   
South Africa 20 5.00 5.00   24 4.17 4.17   
South Korea 47 2.13 2.13 27.66 77 1.30 1.30 23.38 
Spain 114 6.14 2.63 21.05 207 5.31 1.45 12.08 
Sweden 110 2.73 2.73 19.09 179 2.23 1.68 12.29 
Switzerland 106 4.72 3.77 25.47 209 2.87 1.91 13.88 
United 
Kingdom 
1253 7.82 5.19 20.91 2281 5.39 2.85 12.10 
United States 35896 10.56 7.66 21.73 73910 6.55 3.72 11.31 
On Average 1003.81 10.87 8.42 23.81 2030.76 6.61 5.00 15.05 
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Table 3. Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
This table provides definitions of the main variables in the dataset, the data sources, and summary statistics. 
Variable Name Definition Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Number of 
observations 
Main Dependent Variables               
All Angels Dummy A dummy variable equal to 1 for deals with angel investor. 0.063 0.000 0.243 0.000 1.000 85940 
Pure Angel Dummy A dummy variable equal to 1 for deals with only one angel investor. 0.017 0.000 0.128 0.000 1.000 85940 
Mixed Angels Dummy 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for deals with both angel investor and PE 
and VC investors. 
0.046 0.000 0.210 0.000 1.000 85940 
Pure PE and VC Dummy A dummy variable equal to 1 for deals with only PE and VC investors. 0.937 1.000 0.243 0.000 1.000 85940 
Firms with First-Round Angel 
Financing Dummy 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for later deals of those investee firms who 
have received Angel financing in the first round and equals to 0 
otherwise. 
0.116 0.000 0.320 0.000 1.000 43467 
Deal Characteristics               
Deal Size Firm-level deal size (in M$) for the investee companies. 116.750 10.300 807.991 0.010 101002.500 52922 
No. of Deals per Year 
Firm-level number of deals has been made in a year for the investee 
companies. 
1.186 1.000 0.523 1.000 11.000 85940 
Total No. of Deals 
Firm-level total number of deals has been made over the whole sample 
period for the investee companies. 
3.508 3.000 2.889 1.000 41.000 85940 
No. of Investors 
Firm-level number of investors of each completed deal for the investee 
companies. 
1.909 1.000 1.496 1.000 22.000 85940 
Investee Company Characteristics               
Company Valuation 
Firm-level valuation (in M$) for the investee companies at the time of 
deal completed. 
611.590 120.355 2853.799 0.010 118802.500 12758 
No. of Employees Firm-level number of employees in the investee companies. 1368.882 110.000 9976.233 1.000 805600.000 42893 
LN of No. of Employees 
Natural logarithm of firm-level number of employees in the investee 
companies. 
4.860 4.700 2.089 0.000 13.5999 42893 
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Variable Name Definition Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Number of 
observations 
Country Characteristics 
       
GDP per Capita 
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. 
GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the 
economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in 
the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of 
natural resources. Data are in current U.S. dollars. Source: World Bank. 
43606.000 47001.430 9418.821 308.535 193892.300 80090 
LN of GDP per Capita Natural logarithm of GDP per capita. 10.625 10.758 0.475 5.732 12.175 80090 
Domestic Market Capitalization 
The domestic market capitalization of a stock exchange is the total 
number of issued shares of domestic companies, including their several 
classes, multiplied by their respective prices at a given time from the 
World Federation of Exchanges. This figure reflects the comprehensive 
value of the market at that time, in M$. Source: http://www.world-
exchanges.org/statistics/statistics-definitions. 
13900000.000 16200000.000 5566940.000 6.200 20300000.000 79782 
LN of Domestic Market 
Capitalization 
Natural logarithm of domestic market capitalization. 16.200 16.601 1.038 1.825 16.828 79782 
MSCI Returns 
The country-specific Morgan Stanley Capital International index return, a 
proxy for stock market conditions in each country. 
0.054 0.094 0.157 -0.684 1.437 79891 
Minority Shareholders Protection 
Index 
The minority shareholders protection index is the coded weighted 
average index on the ten key legal provisions identified by legal scholars 
as most relevant to the protection of minority shareholder rights (as per 
Guillen and Capron, 2015): powers of the general meeting for de facto 
changes; agenda-setting power; anticipation of shareholder decision 
facilitated; prohibition of multiple voting rights; independent board 
members; feasibility of directors’ dismissal; private enforcement of 
directors’ duties (derivative suit); shareholder action against resolutions 
of the general meeting; mandatory bid; and disclosure of major share 
ownership (as per Lele and Siems, 2007 and Siems, 2008). Higher values 
indicate “better” degree of minority shareholders’ protection and legal 
systems. 
7.019 7.250 0.521 1.000 8.250 77240 
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Variable Name Definition Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Number of 
observations 
IDV 
Hofstede’s index of individualism versus collectivism. The high side of this dimension, called 
individualism, can be defined as a preference for a loosely-knit social framework in which 
individuals are expected to take care of only themselves and their immediate families. Its 
opposite, collectivism, represents a preference for a tightly-knit framework in society in which 
individuals can expect their relatives or members of a particular in-group to look after them in 
exchange for unquestioning loyalty. A society's position on this dimension is reflected in 
whether people’s self-image is defined in terms of “I” or “we.” Source: http://geert-
hofstede.com/national-culture.html. 
87.88 91 10.976 11 91 85514 
UAI 
Hofstede’s index of uncertainty avoidance. The Uncertainty Avoidance dimension expresses 
the degree to which the members of a society feel uncomfortable with uncertainty and 
ambiguity. The fundamental issue here is how a society deals with the fact that the future can 
never be known: should we try to control the future or just let it happen? Countries exhibiting 
strong UAI maintain rigid codes of belief and behavior and are intolerant of unorthodox 
behavior and ideas. Weak UAI societies maintain a more relaxed attitude in which practice 
counts more than principles. Source: http://geert-hofstede.com/national-culture.html. 
46.93 46 7.681 8 112 85514 
Anglo Cultural Zone A dummy variable equal to 1 for Anglo cultural zone, defined by Ronen and Shenkar (2013). 0.923 1 0.267 0 1 89098 
Far East Cultural Zone 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for Far East cultural zone, defined by Ronen and Shenkar 
(2013). 
0.011 0 0.105 0 1 89098 
Germanic Cultural Zone 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for Germanic cultural zone, defined by Ronen and Shenkar 
(2013). 
0.012 0 0.107 0 1 89098 
Latin America Cultural 
Zone 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for Latin America cultural zone, defined by Ronen and Shenkar 
(2013). 
0.005 0 0.069 0 1 89098 
Latin Europe Cultural 
Zone 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for Latin Europe cultural zone, defined by Ronen and Shenkar 
(2013). 
0.020 0 0.140 0 1 89098 
Nordic Cultural Zone A dummy variable equal to 1 for Nordic cultural zone, defined by Ronen and Shenkar (2013). 0.010 0 0.098 0 1 89098 
Confucian Asia Cultural 
Zone 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for Confucian Asia cultural zone, defined by Ronen and Shenkar 
(2013). 
0.012 0 0.110 0 1 89098 
Near East Cultural Zone 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for Near East cultural zone, defined by Ronen and Shenkar 
(2013). 
0.001 0 0.028 0 1 89098 
Arab Cultural Zone A dummy variable equal to 1 for Arab cultural zone, defined by Ronen and Shenkar (2013). 0.000 0 0.016 0 1 89098 
East Europe Cultural 
Zone 
A dummy variable equal to 1 for East Europe cultural zone, defined by Ronen and Shenkar 
(2013). 
0.000 0 0.020 0 1 89098 
  
0.003 0 0.058 0 1 89098 
Exit Outcomes 
       
Successful Exits A dummy variable equal to 1 for either IPO or Acquisition exit. 0.116 0 0.320 0 1 85940 
IPO Exits A dummy variable equal to 1 for an IPO exit. 0.017 0 0.128 0 1 85940 
Acquisition Exits A dummy variable equal to 1 for an Acquisition exit. 0.099 0 0.298 0 1 85940 
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Table 4. Pair-wise Correlations Matrix 
This table provide correlations across the main variables in the dataset. * Significant to at least the 5% level of significance. 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] 
[1] All Angels Dummy 1.00 
              
   
  
[2] Pure Angel Dummy 0.50* 1.00 
             
   
  
[3] Mixed Angels Dummy 0.85* -0.03* 1.00 
            
   
  
[4] Pure PE and VC Dummy -1.00 -0.50* -0.85* 1.00 
           
   
  
[5] LN of GDP per capita 0.03* 0.01* 0.03* -0.03* 1.00 
          
   
  
[6] 
LN of Domestic Market 
Capitalization 
0.03* 0.01* 0.02* -0.03* 0.42* 1.00 
         
   
  
[7] MSCI Returns 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.11* -0.02* 1.00 
           
  
[8] Minority Protection Index 0.04* 0.02* 0.03* -0.04* 0.42* 0.59* -0.11* 1.00 
          
  
[9] LN of Number of Employees -0.12* -0.06* -0.10*  0.12* -0.23* -0.22* 0.07* -0.23* 1.00 
         
  
[10] Number of Deals per Year 0.02* 0.02* 0.01* -0.02* 0.02* 0.04* -0.01 0.04* 0.03* 1.00 
        
  
[11] IDV 0.02* 0.01* 0.02* -0.02* 0.69* 0.72* -0.07* 0.42* -0.20* 0.03* 1.00 
       
  
[12] UAI -0.01* 0.00 -0.01 0.01* -0.06* -0.38* -0.01* -0.19*  0.09* -0.01* -0.38* 1.00 
      
  
[13] Successful Exits -0.09* -0.04* -0.08* 0.09* -0.01 -0.02* 0.03* -0.03* 0.10* -0.05* -0.01* 0.01* 1.00 
     
  
[14] IPO Exits -0.03* -0.02* -0.03* 0.03* -0.06* -0.04* 0.06* -0.07* 0.14* 0.02* -0.03* 0.00 0.36* 1.00 
    
  
[15] Acquisition Exits -0.08* -0.04* -0.07* 0.08* 0.02* -0.01 0.01* 0.00 0.04* -0.07* 0.00 0.01* 0.92* -0.04* 1.00 
   
  
[16] Deal Size -0.03* -0.02* -0.03* 0.03* 0.00 -0.05* 0.02* -0.04* 0.22* -0.01 -0.04* 0.03* 0.10* 0.02* 0.10* 1.00 
  
  
[17] Company Valuation 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.04* 0.02* -0.01 0.22*  0.29* -0.06* 0.04* 0.01 0.05* -0.02*  0.71* 1.00 
 
  
[18] Total No. of Deals 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.06* -0.04* 0.01 0.06*  0.46* 0.07* -0.03* -0.04* 0.06* -0.07* -0.01* 0.26* 1.00   
[19] No. of Investors 0.15* -0.08* 0.23* -0.09* 0.02* 0.03* -0.02* 0.00 -0.15* -0.01* 0.03* -0.02* -0.20* -0.08* -0.18* -0.01* 0.04*  0.11* 1.00 
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Table 5. Mean Descriptive Statistics -- Unmatched vs. Matched Sample Means Comparisons 
This table provides the main mean descriptive statistics across different main characteristics by Angel Deals vs. PE/VC Deals. The table also provides the two-sample means test results between 
major characteristics groups in our data. We present three subpanel analyses; the first subpanel shows the previous unmatched original sample characteristics, and the subsequent two subpanels 
are based on propensity score matching methods based on two different criteria. In the first subsample, we performed PS matching, based on the deal sizes and investee firm industries as PE/VC 
funds’ selection criteria to match angels’ criteria. Then we posed stricter matching criteria based on all characteristics, as presented in the first subpanel of Table 5 to generate the second 
subsample. The means test is a two-sample t-test with equal variance. *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
Original Sample: Angel Deals vs. PE and VC 
Deals 
  
PS Matching Sample 1: Angel Deals vs. PE and 
VC Deals 
  
PS Matching Sample 2: Angel Deals vs. PE and VC 
Deals 
  Angel Deals 
PE and VC 
Deals 
Mean 
Differences  
Angel Deals 
PE and VC 
Deals 
Mean 
Differences  
Angel Deals 
PE and VC 
Deals 
Mean Differences 
Deal 
Characteristics 
  
         
  
Deal Size 27.821 124.884 -97.063*** 
 
427.658 405.161 22.498 
 
427.658 287.757 139.901 
No. of Deals per 
Year 
1.223 1.183 0.040*** 
 
1.243 1.139 0.104 
 
1.243 1.174 0.069 
Total No. of Deals 3.482 3.509 -0.028 
 
4.389 3.569 0.819 
 
4.389 3.361 1.028** 
No. of Investors 2.799 1.849 0.950*** 
 
2.771 1.576 1.194*** 
 
2.771 1.688 1.083*** 
Investee 
Company 
Characteristics 
  
         
  
Company 
Valuation 
595.046 611.848 -16.802 
 
761.922 712.460 49.461 
 
761.922 516.034 245.888 
No. of Employees 509.982 1413.984 -904.002*** 
 
3789.896 1623.306 2166.590 
 
3789.896 2268.514 1521.382 
Country 
Characteristics 
  
         
  
GDP per Capita 45513.550 43476.870 2036.683*** 
 
41747.430 41921.746 -174.316 
 
41747.430 42077.268 -329.838 
Domestic Market 
Capitalization 
14700000.000 13900000.000 846793.600*** 
 
12685752.300 13938458.200 -1252705.890* 
 
12685752.300 14608973.700 -1923221.410*** 
MSCI Returns 0.057 0.054 0.003 
 
0.066 0.056 0.010 
 
0.066 0.073 -0.007 
Minority 
Shareholders 
Protection Index 
7.093 7.011 0.082*** 
 
6.884 6.974 -0.090 
 
6.884 6.950 -0.066 
IDV 88.840 87.819 1.021*** 
 
88.007 89.618 -1.611 
 
88.007 89.264 -1.257 
UAI 46.726 46.942 -0.217** 
 
45.847 46.035 -0.188 
 
45.847 46.340 -0.493 
Exit Outcomes   
         
  
Successful Exits 0.005 0.123 -0.118*** 
 
0.042 0.257 -0.215*** 
 
0.042 0.306 -0.264*** 
IPO Exits 0.000 0.018 -0.018*** 
 
0.007 0.056 -0.049** 
 
0.007 0.111 -0.104*** 
Acquisition Exits 0.005 0.105 -0.100***   0.035 0.201 -0.167***   0.035 0.194 -0.160*** 
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Table 6. Probit Regression Models for H1 
This table presents probit model results of the factors of Angel versus PE/VC investments, and we report the associated marginal effects on those factors. All dependent variables across Models (1) to (20) are different 
indicator dummy variables to capture All Angels, Pure Angel, and Mixed Angel; all other variables are as defined in Table III. Panel A presents results of the original sample; Panel B presents results of the subsample of 
only the first-round deals; Panel C presents results on All Angels by using two PS-matched samples, a non-US sample, and a subsample including only VC and angels; Panel D presents results on All Angels by using two 
PS-matched samples, a non-US sample, and a subsample including only VCs and angels, but with restrictions of only first-round deals. *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: For All Rounds Deals 
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
  All Angels All Angels All Angels All Angels Pure Angel Mixed Angels 
  
Marginal 
Effects 
z score 
Marginal 
Effects 
z score 
Marginal 
Effects 
z score 
Marginal 
Effects 
z score 
Marginal 
Effects 
z score 
Marginal 
Effects 
z score 
LN of GDP per capita 0.1259 2.89*** 0.1961 3.43*** 0.0262 1.15 -0.0087 -0.82 -0.0088 -1.85* -0.0015 -0.18 
LN of Domestic Market 
Capitalization 
-0.0381 -1.95* -0.0535 -2.96*** -0.0098 -1.10 0.0052 1.31 0.0021 1.26 0.0035 1.17 
MSCI Returns 0.0360 2.00** 0.0418 2.51** 0.0208 1.93* 0.0149 1.59 0.0077  3.13*** 0.0072 0.92 
Minority Protection Index 
 
  -0.0303 -2.58*** -0.0206 -3.36*** -0.0146 -3.68*** -0.0042 -2.76*** -0.0104 -3.05*** 
LN of Number of Employees 
 
  
 
  -0.0120 -8.67*** -0.0120 -8.22*** -0.0031 -9.09*** -0.0091 -6.87*** 
Number of Deals per Year 
 
  
 
  0.0062 2.69*** 0.0065 2.86*** 0.0024 2.00** 0.0040 2.09** 
IDV 
 
  
 
  
 
  0.0010 1.00 0.0001 0.45 0.0009 0.91 
UAI 
 
  
 
  
 
  -0.0017 -2.50** -0.0002 -0.46 -0.0015 -3.39*** 
Far East Cultural Zone 
 
  
 
  
 
  0.0268 0.49 -0.0091 -0.43 0.0215 0.40 
Germanic Cultural Zone 
 
  
 
  
 
  0.0680 2.49** -0.0019 -0.13 0.0646 2.51** 
Latin America Cultural Zone 
 
  
 
  
 
  0.1149 1.99** 0.0120 0.63 0.0967 1.76* 
Latin Europe Cultural Zone 
 
  
 
  
 
  0.0920 2.26** 0.0108 0.53 0.0805 2.54** 
Nordic Cultural Zone 
 
  
 
  
 
  -0.1004 -2.78***     -0.0708 -2.28** 
Confucian Asia Cultural Zone 
 
  
 
  
 
  0.0017 0.02     0.0231 0.35 
F.E. Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F.E. Country Yes Yes Yes No No No 
F.E. Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 79229 76651 39304 39728 38494 39684 
Pseudo R2 0.0609 0.0627 0.0709 0.072 0.0673 0.0634 
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Table 6. Probit Regression Models for H1 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: For Only First-Round Deals 
  Model (7) Model (8) Model (9) Model (10) Model (11) Model (12) 
  All Angels All Angels All Angels All Angels Pure Angel Mixed Angels 
  
Marginal 
Effects 
z score 
Marginal 
Effects 
z score 
Marginal 
Effects 
z score 
Marginal 
Effects 
z score 
Marginal 
Effects 
z score 
Marginal 
Effects 
z score 
LN of GDP per capita 0.2251 4.47*** 0.2891 4.84*** 0.1488 3.19*** -0.0015 -0.08 0.0017 0.15 0.0037 0.24 
LN of Domestic Market 
Capitalization 
-0.0779 -3.46*** -0.0928 -4.50*** -0.0556 -3.27*** 0.0003 0.04 0.0003 0.08 -0.0024 -0.46 
MSCI Returns 0.0449 2.08** 0.0501 2.58*** 0.0362 1.92* 0.0166 0.71 0.0079 1.42 0.0101 0.49 
Minority Protection Index 
 
  -0.0277 -2.34** -0.0290 -2.36** -0.0017 -0.27 -0.0072 -2.65*** 0.0029 0.53 
LN of Number of Employees 
 
  
 
  -0.0117 -5.82*** -0.0121 -5.29*** -0.0047 -5.27*** -0.0082 -4.33*** 
Number of Deals per Year 
 
  
 
  0.0357 5.87*** 0.0366 6.36*** 0.0115 3.60*** 0.0252 5.56*** 
IDV 
 
  
 
  
 
  0.0032 2.21** 0.0041 2.69*** 0.0019 1.69* 
UAI 
 
  
 
  
 
  -0.0013 -1.97** 0.0010 0.84 -0.0011 -2.29** 
Far East Cultural Zone 
 
  
 
  
 
  0.1340 1.48 0.1974 2.11** 0.0831 1.24 
Germanic Cultural Zone 
 
  
 
  
 
  0.1228 3.42*** 0.0631 2.71*** 0.0899 3.19*** 
Latin America Cultural Zone 
 
  
 
  
 
  0.1724 1.90*     0.1280 1.74* 
Latin Europe Cultural Zone 
 
  
 
  
 
  0.1100 2.20** 0.0154 0.28 0.0808 2.01** 
Nordic Cultural Zone 
 
  
 
  
 
  -0.0388 -0.90     -0.0262 -0.77 
Confucian Asia Cultural Zone 
 
  
 
  
 
  0.1606 1.75*     0.1007 1.37 
F.E. Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F.E. Country No No No No No No 
F.E. Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 37301 35981 15876 16175 14530 16150 
Pseudo R2 0.1043 0.1072 0.1177 0.1167 0.1345 0.0887 
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Table 6. Probit Regression Models for H1 (Continued) 
Panel C: Robustness Checks using Matched Samples and Non-US sample - All Rounds Deals 
  Model (13) Model (14) Model (15) Model (16) 
  All Angels (Matched Sample 1) All Angels (Matched Sample 2) All Angels (Non-US Subsample) All Angels (VC Deals Only) 
  Marginal Effects z score Marginal Effects z score Marginal Effects z score Marginal Effects z score 
LN of GDP per capita 0.0220 2.20** 0.5076 2.18** -0.0221 -2.46** 0.0177 0.53 
LN of Domestic Market Capitalization -0.0078 -1.56 -0.1804 -0.75 0.0018 0.47 -0.0189 -1.44 
MSCI Returns -0.0060 -0.76 -0.1383 -0.75 0.0026 0.26 0.1039 3.34*** 
Minority Protection Index -0.0080 -1.93* -0.1852 -1.96** -0.0122 -2.89*** -0.0370 -2.53** 
LN of Number of Employees -0.0009 -0.92 -0.0211 -0.94 -0.0055 -4.12*** -0.0057 -1.71* 
Number of Deals per Year 0.0041  2.35** 0.0951 2.31** 0.0064 0.94 -0.0069 -1.17 
IDV 0.0003 0.30 0.0075 0.30 0.0008 1.46 0.0020 0.55 
UAI -0.0015 -2.62*** -0.0336 -2.50** -0.0010 -2.58*** -0.0063 -2.67*** 
Ronen & Shenkar Cultural Zones Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F.E. Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F.E. Country No No No No 
F.E. Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 7660 7660 2993 13035 
Pseudo R2 0.0721 0.0721 0.1002 0.0414 
Panel D: Robustness Checks using Matched Samples and Non-US sample - First-Round Deals Only 
  Model (17) Model (18) Model (19) Model (20) 
  All Angels (Matched Sample 1) All Angels (Matched Sample 2) All Angels (Non-US Subsample) All Angels (VC Deals Only) 
  Marginal Effects z score Marginal Effects z score Marginal Effects z score Marginal Effects z score 
LN of GDP per capita 0.0418 2.30** 0.0418 2.30** -0.0429 -2.71*** 0.1942 2.92*** 
LN of Domestic Market Capitalization -0.0195 -2.52** -0.0195 -2.52** -0.0026 -0.53 -0.0543 -2.03** 
MSCI Returns -0.0070 -0.47 -0.0070 -0.47 -0.0144 -0.82 0.1204 1.54 
Minority Protection Index -0.0085 -1.31 -0.0085 -1.31 -0.0064 -1.35 0.0159 0.74 
LN of Number of Employees 0.0022 1.82* 0.0022 1.82* -0.0067 -3.76*** 0.0092 1.69* 
Number of Deals per Year 0.0109 1.52 0.0109 1.52 0.0048 0.36 0.0292 1.42 
IDV 0.0045 1.78* 0.0045 1.78* 0.0021 2.67*** 0.0067 1.19 
UAI -0.0008 -0.75 -0.0008 -0.75 -0.0006 -1.03 -0.0066 -2.21** 
Ronen & Shenkar Cultural Zones Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F.E. Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F.E. Country No No No No 
F.E. Year Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 3036 3036 1454 3787 
Pseudo R2 0.0689 0.0689 0.1225 0.0602 
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Table 7. Probit Regression Models for Exits Outcomes 
This table presents probit model results of the factors of exit outcomes, and we report the associated marginal effects of those factors. The dependent variables across Models (1) to (24) are different dummy variables that 
capture all successful exits, all IPO exits, and all acquisition exits; all other variables are as defined in Table III. Panel A presents results of the original sample; Panels B and C present results using two PS-matched 
samples. For conciseness, we exclude all control variables, which contain the exact same variables in Table VI: LN of GDP per capita, LN of Domestic Market Capitalization, MSCI Returns, Minority Protection Index, LN 
of Number of Employees, Number of Deals per Year, IDV, and UAI. *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Successful Exits - Original Sample, Non-US and VC Subsamples 
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) 
  Successful Exits IPO Exits Acquisition Exits Successful Exits IPO Exits Acquisition Exits 
Successful Exits 
(Non-US) 
Successful Exits 
(VC) 
  
Marginal 
Effects 
z score 
Marginal 
Effects 
z score 
Marginal 
Effects 
z score 
Marginal 
Effects 
z 
score 
Marginal 
Effects 
z score 
Marginal 
Effects 
z 
score 
Marginal 
Effects 
z score 
Marginal 
Effects 
z 
score 
All Angels -0.2665 -15.29*** -0.0819 -4.80*** -0.2071 -11.18*** -0.2837 -0.98 -0.6389 -6.37*** 0.0057 0.03 -0.1335 -2.14** 0.0010 0.56 
All Angels * Minority 
Protection Index  
  
 
  
 
  0.0025 0.06 0.0795 5.29*** -0.0303 -1.12 
 
  
 
  
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ronen & Shenkar 
Cultural Zones 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F.E. Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F.E. Country No No No No No No No No 
F.E. Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
Observations 
39876 39649 39876 39876 39649 39876 3379 8777 
Pseudo R2 0.0396 0.1387 0.0338 0.0396 0.1389 0.0338 0.0363 0.1131 
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Table 7. Probit Regression Models for Exits Outcomes (Continued) 
Panel B: Successful Exits - Matched Sample 1 
  Model (9) Model (10) Model (11) Model (12) Model (13) Model (14) Model (15) Model (16) 
  Successful Exits IPO Exits Acquisition Exits Successful Exits IPO Exits Acquisition Exits 
Successful Exits (Non-
US) 
Successful Exits 
(VC) 
  
Marginal 
Effects 
z score 
Marginal 
Effects 
z score 
Marginal 
Effects 
z score 
Marginal 
Effects 
z 
score 
Marginal 
Effects 
z score 
Marginal 
Effects 
z 
score 
Marginal 
Effects 
z score 
Marginal 
Effects 
z 
score 
All Angels -0.4186 -6.53*** -0.1464 -2.84*** -0.3112 -4.58*** -0.6380 -0.90 -2.0189 -4.96*** -0.2575 -0.53 -0.1144 -1.18 0.0014 0.10 
All Angels * Minority 
Protection Index  
  
 
  
 
  0.0314 0.31 0.2621 4.34*** -0.0077 -0.11 
 
  
 
  
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ronen & Shenkar 
Cultural Zones 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F.E. Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F.E. Country No No No No No No No No 
F.E. Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
Observations 
8065 8030 8065 8065 8030 8065 820 251 
Pseudo R2 0.0599 0.1145 0.0566 0.0599 0.1147 0.0566 0.0962 0.2919 
Panel C: Successful Exits - Matched Sample 2 
  Model (17) Model (18) Model (19) Model (20) Model (21) Model (22) Model (23) Model (24) 
  Successful Exits IPO Exits Acquisition Exits Successful Exits IPO Exits Acquisition Exits 
Successful Exits (Non-
US) 
Successful Exits 
(VC) 
  
Marginal 
Effects 
z score 
Marginal 
Effects 
z score 
Marginal 
Effects 
z score 
Marginal 
Effects 
z 
score 
Marginal 
Effects 
z score 
Marginal 
Effects 
z 
score 
Marginal 
Effects 
z score 
Marginal 
Effects 
z 
score 
All Angels -0.4176 -6.29*** -0.1466 -2.85*** -0.3089 -4.38*** -0.6777 -1.07 -2.0771 -5.28*** -0.2160 -0.48 -0.1090 -1.06 0.0014 0.10 
All Angels * Minority 
Protection Index  
  
 
  
 
  0.0373 0.42 0.2703 4.61*** -0.0133 -0.21 
 
  
 
  
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ronen & Shenkar 
Cultural Zones 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F.E. Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F.E. Country No No No No No No No No 
F.E. Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
Observations 
7970 7944 7970 7970 7944 7970 744 251 
Pseudo R2 0.0637 0.1118 0.0606 0.0637 0.1121 0.0606 0.0718 0.2919 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
Table 8. Regression Models for Testing First-Round Angel Certification Effect on Exits 
This table presents clustered probit model results of the factors of exit outcomes, and we report the associated marginal effects of those 
factors. We analyze separately the impact of firms with first-round angel finance. All dependent variables across Models (1) to (3) are 
different, with a dummy variable to capture all successful exits: all IPO exits and all acquisition exits; all other variables are as defined in 
Table III. For conciseness, we exclude all control variables, which contain the exact same variables in Table VI: LN of GDP per capita, LN of 
Domestic Market Capitalization, MSCI Returns, Minority Protection Index, LN of Number of Employees, Number of Deals per Year, IDV, 
and UAI. *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) 
  Successful Exits IPO Exits Acquisition Exits 
  Marginal Effects z score Marginal Effects z score Marginal Effects z score 
Firms with First-Round Angel 
Financing -0.0432 -5.00*** -0.0031 -0.62 -0.0467 -5.86*** 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Ronen & Shenkar Cultural Zones Yes Yes Yes 
F.E. Industry Yes Yes Yes 
F.E. Country No No No 
F.E. Year Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 23516 23433 23516 
Pseudo R2 0.0584 0.1646 0.0473 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
